

WTT

7-26-68

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MCGREGOR BROWN
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Reports of an Imminent Large-Scale
Uprising in Cuba

In accordance with your request to Mr. Cottrell,
I am enclosing a copy of a Memorandum with attachment
prepared by his office on the subject of reports of
an imminent large-scale uprising in Cuba.

William H. Bruback
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Memorandum with attachment.

ARIA:RAH/Murwitz/RW/leestsdg:ars
2/10/10

DECLASSIFIED

FO. 11552, Ser. 361 and 360 or (S)

State Sect. NLK-75-174
by MFD MAR. Date 5-28-76

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

Subject: Reports of an Imminent Large-Scale
Uprising in Cuba

Reports of a large-scale uprising in Cuba on February 20, accompanied by a call for U. S. assistance, are given little credence by our intelligence analysts (see attached assessment of these reports). Resistance groups lack effective leadership, organization, and united purpose. Military leadership appears loyal to Fidel Castro and Cuban ground forces are fully able to control known opposition.

Government security forces have moved into the areas where possible resistance may be expected; they have penetrated resistance groups; and therefore the report of an uprising may be a Castro device to trap opponents into exposing themselves.

Sporadic, uncoordinated and quickly suppressed acts of resistance, possibly accompanied by a call for assistance, may occur in Cuba during the coming months. These sporadic acts of defiance would present no effective threat to the regime nor would they warrant the commitment of U. S. military forces.

We do not believe therefore that it is necessary to pre-position forces at this time. We would, however, exploit through all propaganda media the Castro regime suppression of a small-scale indigenous effort toward freedom.

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E.O.11652, Sec. 3(e) and 5(O)(S)
State Dept., NLK-75-124
By MFO, NQFS, 5/9/76

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Alternative Course of Action in the Event the Reported Large-scale Uprising Occurs

Should the reported large-scale uprising accompanied by a call for help occur, we must decide whether the situation warrants the support of U. S. military forces and whether possible Soviet reactions elsewhere can be successfully met. Should we decide affirmatively, we must be prepared to commit all U. S. military assets necessary to achieve success in Cuba.

If a decision is reached to commit U. S. military forces against Cuba, we would propose the following principal courses of action:

i) Political Actions

- a) Recognize the insurgents as the Government of Cuba.
- b) Dispatch personal privileged communication to Chairman Khrushchev informing him of imminent U. S. military action in support of widespread resistance against the Castro regime and warning him to take all measures to minimize losses among Soviet forces in Cuba.
- c) Convoke the OAS to consider measures for assisting the insurgents.
- d) Solicit the military participation of selected Latin American countries.
- e) Forestall Soviet UN action by taking our issue to the Security Council.
- f) Brief key members of Congress, Foreign Ambassadors, the press, and the media.

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actions and instruct our posts abroad to inform host governments.

- c) Utilize the facilities of USIS to further our activities.
- b) Military Actions (approved military plans exist)
 - a) Air Strike (as a prelude to commitment of other forces).
Air strike reaction time may be reduced to as little as 48 hours. The air strike may range from destruction of some or all of the SAM sites to a full scale attack on all Cuba targets contributing to Cuba's war capability.
 - b) Unconventional warfare for the purpose of supporting the uprising.
 - c) Invasion.
Currently 18 days from day of decision. This plan is currently under review by the JCS. Simultaneous airborne and amphibious assaults would be launched against designated areas.

RECOMMENDATION

- i) That we take no action at this time.
- j) If an uprising accompanied by a call for help occurs and we decide to commit U. S. military forces, we should undertake the political-military actions

described above.

Neither the DDCI nor the CIA have reviewed
this report in its entirety.

Sterling J. Cottrell
Coordinator of Cuban Affairs

Attachment:

Assessment of reports.

ARA:RMurwitz:RPollestad:arc
2/10/63

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